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The Paris Agreement introduces long-term strategies as an instrument to inform progressively more 
ambitious emission reduction objectives, whilst holding development goals paramount in context of 
national circumstances. In the lead up to COP21, the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 
developed mid-century low-emission pathways for 16 countries, based on an innovative pathway 
design framework. In this Perspective we describe this framework and show how it can support the 
development of sectorally and technologically detailed and policy-relevant country-driven strategies 
consistent with the Paris Agreement climate goal. We also discuss how this framework can be used 
to engage stakeholder input and buy-in; design implementation policy packages; reveal necessary 
technological, financial and institutional enabling conditions; and support global stock-taking and 
ratcheting of ambition.   
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The climate goal of the Paris Agreement (PA) is to hold ”the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C” (Art. 2.1). This requires net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
the second half of the century (Art. 4.1), as a necessary condition to stay within the remaining 
cumulative emissions budget of approximately 600-1200 Gt CO2e in the 21st century.1,2  No region 
nor sector is exempt from this requirement; any excess emissions must be compensated with 
negative emissions.   
The PA requires Parties to submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), representing 
voluntary commitments formulated by each country at a 10-15 year horizon in the light of the above 
collective objective (Art. 3 and 4.2).  These NDCs are to be designed within the context of other 
development goals defined by national circumstances (PA preamble), including the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) relating to energy access and security, air quality, poverty alleviation, and 
employment creation.3,4 Given the widely acknowledged lack of collective ambition in the first round 
of NDCs, the PA requires Parties to submit a revised, more ambitious NDC every five years (Art. 4.3 
and 4.9 ). The PA also mandates Global Stocktaking exercises every five years to assess progress 
against the collective objective (Art 14).  
To inform these processes, country parties are invited to  “formulate and communicate long-term 
low GHG emission development strategies” (Art. 4.19), filed with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. We argue here  that these long-term strategies can be a central 
enabling instrument for reconciling the long-term and global nature of the climate objective with the 
medium term horizon and national scale of the NDCs, and thus inform policy.  Strategies based on 
pathways reverse forecasted from the long term goal to the present, or “backcasted”, would ensure 
consistency of national near-term planning, investment and policy decisions with long term social, 
economic and environmental goals in the context of inertia, lock-in risks, and mitigation 
innovation.5,6 Using backcasted pathways, strategies can also reveal the key international enabling 
conditions required for nations to adopt ambitious mitigation, such as technology development and 
transfer, finance for investment and adaptation, and institutional support. 
For a long-term strategy to play these roles it must be sufficiently understood and accepted by a 
working majority of stakeholders, both those responsible for implementation and those affected by 
the transformation (e.g. governments, indigenous peoples’ organizations, sector associations, firms, 
energy utilities, unions, experts, households, non-governmental organizations, etc.).   To enable this, 
a process is required to educate these stakeholders, gather their essential inputs, and create a 
structured space for dialogue among them to design and rigorously debate such pathways. This 
requires that the strategies be formulated in a qualitative or semi-quantitative language 
understandable to all stakeholders. But it also requires they be expressed in comparable quantitative 
scenarios, characterized by economy-wide, internally consistent sets of parameters describing the 
evolution of emissions drivers at the sectoral level, as well as key socioeconomic and development 
indicators.  
The first section identifies four key methodological principles to develop and combine qualitative 
narrative strategies with quantitative scenarios that can feed into national and global pathway 
development processes. We then describe how these methods were developed and used in the Deep 
Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP). The third section, A Paris-compatible pathway design 
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framework, synthesizes the approach by articulating them in a consistent pathways design 
framework, before we conclude with implications, recommendations and further research needs.   
 Methodological challenges to inform the post-Paris process 
There is already a rich literature on global low emissions scenarios using Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAMs)7, which formed the backbone of analysis in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 5th Assessment Report (IPCC AR5)1. This “data spine” helped demonstrate that a global low 
emission pathway is possible, while clarifying that the global temperature goal of “well below +2°C” 
requires reducing global emissions to net-zero and likely net-negative around 2050 or soon after.1,2 
Recent studies on ambitious climate goals from this literature have analysed socio-economic aspects 
such as economic growth and fossil fuel availability8, the distributional consequences among major 
economies9, and the interplay with the SDGs10. Some studies have also assessed the effect of current 
NDCs on achieving the PA climate objective11, and the conditions for reaching 1.5°C climate 
stabilization.2 Country-level scenarios consistent with ambitious mitigation objectives have even 
been investigated through multi-model comparisons, e.g. for Asian countries12 and Latin American 
countries.13 
This global IAM approach has limitations, however, that need to be addressed for supporting the 
national policy processes envisaged in the PA.14–16 On the practical side, IAMs are resource intensive 
models that require specialized teams to build and run, beyond the capacity of many countries and 
of most national actors who would like to contribute to policy debate and planning.  In addition, the 
IAM storylines are arranged in “Shared Socioeconomic Pathways”8, which do not distinguish 
technological and policy deviations due to individual country circumstances. Finally, the 
mathematical representation of complex climate-economy systems in global IAMs requires 
simplifications that limit their ability to represent specific national circumstances, objectives and 
policy approaches.17 IAMs conventionally adopt aggregate sectoral and regional representations as 
well as simplified economic and behavioural assumptions that can miss country specific mitigation 
options and limitations.18 These modelling choices lead to a superficially simple focus on price-
oriented mitigation policies based on cost-benefit approaches19, restricting consideration of a wider 
range of policy instruments20,21 and objectives. In particular, many IAMs face structural challenges 
including context-specific aspects of non-climate co-benefits or costs.22  
There is also a “bottom-up” literature23, designed around national circumstances and policy, which 
conducts country-scale investigation of development and ambitious climate objectives for a wide 
range of countries across Asia24–28, Latin America29–34, Africa35,36, Europe37–43 and North America.44–49 
Several studies describe multi-country exercises in which country teams co-explored their domestic 
pathways.50–52 To date, these studies have, however, lacked the overarching global context inherent 
in the IAM approach because the boundary conditions of national studies are not systematically 
defined according to a consistent cross-country vision the global transformation (e.g. carbon 
budgets, technological assumptions on learning and transfer, fossil fuel prices and their supply, 
international demand assumptions, etc.).53   
We propose a new approach is needed to support the PA, one that combines key elements of the 
global IAM and national bottom-up modelling literatures to provide a structured global context for 
policy-relevant analyses of national low greenhouse gas emission development strategies. Its 
purpose would be to allow formation of national strategies consistent with country circumstances, 
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place-specific development objectives and national political priorities, reflecting a coherent cross-
country global context, and compatible with the collective ambition towards the temperature goal.11  
This hybrid approach requires that four key methodological challenges are addressed. 
First, the design of low emissions strategies is faced with many global and country-specific 
uncertainties, making necessary a multi-scenario approach exploring different plausible futures. To 
support the design of robust national strategies and policies, the different futures must be defined 
from the key uncertainties affecting most importantly the trajectory of the specific country 
considered.   
Second, to be useful for policymaking, quantitative national scenarios should not only describe 
emissions trajectories but also provide transparent sectoral detail of the broader social, economic 
and technological changes within which they are founded. Modelling is useful for this purpose, but 
no single model is able to encompass all the sectoral and socio-economic indicators required to 
characterize development trajectories. A flexible, inclusive approach to modelling is needed.  
Third, comparability across different countries is also important to facilitate knowledge sharing and 
enable a global composite to emerge from national visions. This requires a systematic quantitative 
structure identifying key sectoral and development metrics and built to accommodate scenarios from 
different sources. We refer to this reporting structure as a “dashboard”.  
Fourth, pathways analysis should help identify the options to reach mid-century development 
objectives and emissions neutrality starting from the present. The design of these pathways starts 
from the definition of realistic 2050 benchmark values for the key indicators listed in the dashboard. 
A backcasting approach is then needed to identify the systemic changes required to move these 
indicators from their present values to ranges in line with these benchmarks. 
In the following section, we provide insights on how to concretely address these challenges through 
an approach that is bottom-up, country-driven, policy-relevant and consistent with a global 
mitigation goal. We derive these insights by documenting methodological lessons from the Deep 
Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP)54–56, wherein sectorally detailed mitigation scenarios were 
designed to reflect national development and political circumstances according to the above four 
principles. The project, coordinated by the Institute for Sustainable Development and International 
Relations (IDDRI) and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), was composed of 
country research teams from 16 developed and emerging economies representing 74% of 2010 
global energy-related CO2 emissions. The DDPP studies subsequently influenced the climate policy 
debate in several of these countries.57,58  
This paper does not focus on the details of the DDPP results as published in 2015-16 for two reasons. 
First, because the DDPP was conducted before COP21, the climate objective was chosen as a 50% 
probability of maintaining 2°C, therefore less ambitious than the “well below 2°C … towards 1.5°C” 
framing introduced in the PA. Second, while some DDPP teams included land use and fugitive 
emissions, the aggregate project results focused on energy-related combustion and process 
emissions, hence failing to capture all GHG sources. In this paper, we will discuss the methodological 
lessons that were learned from the DDPP and would be useful for implementation of the PA.  In 
Conclusions, we discuss how a DDPP-type exercise could be re-done with the PA framing, i.e. 
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considering more ambitious climate objectives and non-energy emissions, especially from the land-
use sector.  
2. Guidelines for national low emission development pathways
We describe below key features of the DDPP method, designed to address the challenges presented 
in above. They constitute the four building blocks of the DDPP pathways design framework, 
synthesized in in the next section, A Paris-compatible pathway design framework.  
2.1 Country driven strategies in a context of deep uncertainty 
In the DDPP, given the focus on energy-related emissions, the strategies were structured around 
three key drivers: 1) energy efficiency and conservation, including structural and behavioural 
changes; 2) decarbonization of energy carriers (electricity, heat, liquids and gases); and 3) end-use 
switching to these low-carbon carriers.  How these three “pillars of decarbonization” were applied, 
however, depended on national circumstances, including a country’s development priorities, 
institutions,  economic structure, political situation, endowment in renewable energy and other key 
resources, and many other factors.   
A multi-decade evolution of technologies, socio-economic conditions and politics17,59, such as that 
associated with a transition to a net-zero energy system60, is characterized by “deep uncertainty”.61 
In this context, standard methods for risk and decision analysis62, based on probability distributions 
surrounding a “best-guess” of the future, may not be appropriate. Instead, the identification of 
different strategies in response to various plausible futures supports an adaptive decision-making 
process63 that allows policymakers to learn and adjust to evolving information, technology and 
events.64,65 This approach allows definition of robust strategies which perform well under a range of 
future conditions.66  
Each country team in the DDPP therefore developed a small number of internally consistent 
narrative strategies, developed and expressed in the language of stakeholders. All strategies 
implement the three pillars of decarbonisation, but each variant reflects sensitivity to key 
uncertainties, as freely chosen by the country teams according to their national circumstances.  Some 
teams focussed on international conditions, e.g. the oil price in the Canadian DDPP study67, which 
drove oil production volumes during the transition.  Others focussed on socio-economic drivers, e.g. 
labour skills profiles in the South African DDPP study68, which determined the plausibility of 
alternative low GHG economic structures. The Italian study69 addressed the social acceptability of 
carbon capture and storage. The Indian team70 focussed on the policy implications of climate-centric 
vs. sustainable development approaches to GHG emissions. The French team71 explored different 
strategies under varying effectiveness of energy efficiency programs, notably in the building sector.  
2.2 Modelling development pathways 
National models play a key role in translating the above narrative strategies into quantified scenarios, 
consistently assessing key socio-economic and technological indicators. The socio-economic metrics 
non-exclusively include unemployment rates, skills profiles and population in income classes (South 
Africa68), the import dependency index (Japan72, India70 and Germany73), local air pollutant levels 
(China74, India70), and the energy poverty index (UK75). Country-relevant identification of these 
6
 
indicators and their assessment in a transparent manner is key to the design and sharing of strategies 
by public and private decisionmakers and stakeholders. 
Different model types are appropriate for different scales and sectors. The DDPP pathway design 
framework (synthesized in Section 3) was conceived to accommodate different modelling paradigm 
and tool, as appropriate for quantification given the specific focus of the analysis.76  The choice of 
models and their level of complexity should be made whilst considering their capacity to inform the 
practical needs of political dialogue and policy formation.2,3 The modelling approach must also be 
pragmatic and sensitive to ease-of-use, data availability, budget and timescales.  
The national DDPP studies were supported by a variety of modelling tools, chosen by the research 
teams in each context, with varying areas of focus and level of detail.23  The DDPP study of South 
Africa investigated poverty alleviation and unemployment reduction68,77, combining an energy 
system model with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that portrayed disaggregated 
labour skill classes and their sectoral employment. The Japanese analysis focussed on energy security 
concerns72,78, requiring a detailed energy supply and demand bottom-up model. The study for China 
highlighted the air quality co-benefits of mitigation by coupling energy system and air pollution 
models.74 The study of India combined analysis of air quality and energy security benefits.70 The 
Australian analysis included dedicated analysis of land-based sequestration options, requiring a land 
use model.79 A key focus of the Brazilian study was on inequality and land use, employing a hybrid 
CGE model which portrayed the evolution of income distribution across household income classes 
while also including biofuel, agriculture and forestry mitigation options.80 The study of the USA 
discussed issues posed by integration of substantial variable electricity generation combined with 
electricity based synthetic hydrocarbon production, requiring the use of a dispatch model.81  
2.3 Scenario data reporting 
Model outputs vary from one tool to the other, depending on paradigm, research focus, and scope, 
which can lead to stakeholder confusion and difficulties in policy design and implementation. A 
consistent set of comparable and quantified results gathered in a spreadsheet “dashboard”, reported 
systematically across modelling tools and country studies, can serve three complementary purposes 
relevant to the post-Paris process. 
First, the dashboard serves as a “driver dictionary”. It expresses the main determinants of a country’s 
sectoral transformation through a common language, enabling cross-country comparisons, 
benchmarking and learning. These commonly defined drivers allow a country team to compare its 
ambition with the collective requirements characterized by sectoral benchmarks (see Backcasting 
using long-term benchmarks). 
Second, the dashboard variables characterize the physical sectoral and sub-sectoral transformations 
at a sufficient level of granularity and technical transparency for dialogue with sectoral and 
technology experts. This detailed information can serve policy instrument selection within the 
context of sectoral and national circumstances.  
Third, the dashboard serves as an aggregator in a bottom-up approach, where the global vision 
emerges as a composite of sectoral and national pathways. Beyond emissions accounting, the 
dashboard allows a physical view of the global transformations (e.g., solar panel capacity, number of 
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electric vehicles). This information can serve, along with analysis of learning rates and economies of 
scale, as inputs for assessment of investment needs at the national and global level.56 This enables a 
transparent analysis and discussion of where global-scale cooperation is needed to decarbonize key 
sectors such as power generation, transport and industry, including technology development and 
transfer, financing, and institutional capacity.82,83   
Given the focus of the DDPP on energy-related emissions, the dashboard was based on a 
decomposition of activity, energy intensity and energy mixes for key energy end-use demands (i.e. 
buildings, transport and industry) and energy supply (i.e. electricity, liquids and gases). In addition, 
the dashboard included cumulative data on power generation capacities (in GW, by technology), 
passenger vehicles (number of vehicles by energy type) and liquid energy carriers (in EJ)54,56; see 
supplement for full detail of dashboard content in the DDPP.  
2.4 Backcasting using long-term benchmarks 
To guide their self-determined contributions to the global effort, countries need to identify national 
pathways that satisfy key long-run socio-economic objectives, reach very low GHG emission levels, 
and maximize co-benefits, all in an economically efficient way. Approaching these pathways as 
country-driven back-casts from these objectives puts the long run constraint at the center of the 
process, questioning how short-term investment and policy choices affect the capacity to reach long-
term objectives. This approach directly confronts analysts with the consequences of potential sector 
lock-ins and stranded assets (e.g. investments in coal plants, NG networks or LNG terminals and their 
potential for retrofitting with CCS or renewable methane), and the necessary domestic and 
international conditions to avoid them, notably when considering long lived assets like infrastructure, 
buildings and industrial facilities.83 
Country teams, governments or other parties, working independently on their national pathways, 
need ex-ante guidance to define the necessary physical transformations to meet their emissions and 
development objectives. To this aim, common overall and sectoral benchmarks can be used that are 
mapped against the variables listed in the dashboard . These benchmarks characterize the scale and 
detail of transformative change required by 2050 to achieve the objective of net-zero emissions in 
the second half of the century, or by 2050 in the case of 1.5°C. 2  
In the DDPP, the benchmarks for emission levels in 2050 compatible with a given climate objective 
and corresponding sectoral emissions intensities were based on the IAM informed global averages 
from Working Group III (WG3) of the IPCC AR5. For example, an electricity sector generation 
benchmark for 2050 was set at -30 to +50 grams CO2/kWh, based on Ch.7 WG3 AR5 “Energy 
Systems”, Fig. 7.7.84  
To ensure a coherent cross-country global context, collective assumptions were also made regarding 
the availabity of some technologies that would depend on large-scale R&D involving international 
cooperation and transfer. The nature and speed of the deployment of the technologies and the 
corresponding domestic sectoral transformations towards the common benchmarks would then 
differ by country, according to national circumstances and priorities affecting the relevance of 
different options. For example, the above electricity benchmark could be reached through different 
power generation mixes according to country circumstances (e.g., endowment of renewables and 
capacity to balance them, storage capacity for carbon capture, or social acceptability of nuclear).  
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Another key example included the eventual adoption by all teams of combinations of electric, biofuel 
or hybrid  personal vehicles as a key strategy to decarbonize passenger transport.    
The next sections discusses how this backcasting approach using long-term benchmarks is embedded 
in the complete DDPP pathways design framework, built from the four points discussed in this 
section.  
3. A Paris-compatible pathway design framework
In the DDPP pathways design framework, synthesized in Figure 1, the process began with the 
definition of multiple country-driven strategies reflecting key uncertainties. These narrative 
strategies were then converted into quantitative scenarios with technical, social and economic 
characteristics using analytical assessment tools, including national-scale models but also other tools 
as appropriate. Transparent and detailed scenario results were then reported against a common set 
of indicators in the dashboard. These results were analysed to assess if the domestic emissions and 
socioeconomic indicators, as well as cumulative global emissions, were consistent with the 
backcasted benchmarks.85,86 
A key design point of the DDPP pathways design process was its iterative nature, supported by two 
learning processes. On the one hand, the dashboard results could be compared by the country teams 
against the benchmark national and sectoral emission drivers compatible with the collective climate 
objective. On the other hand, the common dashboard adopted by the different country teams 
enabled the comparison of assumptions across countries and learning about the possibility of 
different actions. These two learning processes led the teams to progressively revise their strategy 
and scenario assumptions, notably regarding technical potentials for decarbonisation in the different 
sectors. This allowed those that were initially out of compliance to meet and exceed the benchmarks, 
while the already ambitious went further. The resulting pathways presented in the DDPP country and 
global synthesis54 reports are the final outcomes of these iterations. They constitute a self-
assessment by in-country researchers of what physical sector transformations can be chosen to put 
the domestic economy on track with the net-zero emissions objective. 
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Figure 1 The DDPP pathway design framework 
The DDPP results illustrate how the pathways design framework can help inform the key issues of 
ambition, cooperation and equity 
First, this approach does not guarantee consistency with the climate goal as defined by cumulative 
global emissions. But, even if national cumulative emissions were not prescribed ex-ante, the 
resulting pathways were collectively compatible with the cumulative emission reductions required 
for the chosen climate objective. More specifically, when extrapolating emission trajectories to 
include all sources of emissions not explicitly covered in the DDPP (see Supplement for details), 
cumulative GHG emissions over 2010-2050 fell in the range of 1185-1555 Gt CO2. This is consistent 
with the 1166-1566 Gt CO2 range for 50% chance of 2°C (see Table SPM.1 WGIII AR5 in IPCC (2014)1). 
These results provide a proof of concept for the DDPP approach to finding domestic mitigation 
actions countries could take to meet the global mitigation goal of the Paris Agreement.  
Second, this approach also does not assume a priori the exact nature of cross-country interactions. 
However, the DDPP results show how country-driven studies can inform the collective enabling 
conditions for the domestic mitigation actions to be possible, such as technology learning and 
transfer, or financial requirements to support investment needs. 56,82 Such global assessment is made 
possible because country pathways are built from a coherent cross-country context on technology 
availability (see Backcasting using long-term benchmarks above), and because the individual country 
results were reported into a common dashboard, making possible the reconstruction of the global 
transformations emerging from national studies (see Scenario data reporting). 
Finally, mindful that countries would favour different equity principles and criteria87,88, the analysis 
does not state how the costs or benefits of mitigation are to be shared among countries, nor how 
much each country contributes to the international cooperative efforts. The allocation of effort in 
support of other countries’ domestic measures will be grounded in analysis of domestic and 
international equity88–90, including reference to norms of responsibility, capability, need, equality, 
and implications for international financial  and technology transfers.87,88,91–93 This analysis was 
beyond the scope of the analysis, and the DDPP analysis therefore does not directly define how the 
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contributions that a country must submit under the Paris Agreement are “fair and ambitious” 
(decision 1/CP.21, para 27).” It does, however, provide a basis to assess this equity question from a 
bottom-up perspective against the physical regional and sectoral requirements of net-zero 
decarbonization, however they are paid for. A collective discussion and negotiation is one of the key 
purposes of the regular global stock take. Explicit documentation of global enabling conditions, as 
permitted by the above pathways design framework, is therefore a core input to the global 
stocktaking effort, which is to be viewed “in the light of equity” (Article 14.1).  
4. Conclusion
New analytical processes and tools are needed to support the process codified in the PA. They should 
support the design of national low greenhouse gas emission development strategies that are 
consistent with global ambition and can support national policy formation and implementation.  
They should also inform the sectoral and international discussions needed to reveal the key points of 
global cooperation. Based on the DDPP, we have described principles and methodologies for such an 
approach. These include: the definition of multiple country-specific strategies framed by common 
drivers of decarbonisation in a context of deep uncertainty; the use of a variety of national modelling 
tools to translate narrative strategies into quantified scenarios and indicators reported in a common 
dashboard; and national and sectoral benchmarks to provide guidance towards collective mid-
century mitigation ambition. These building blocks are combined in an iterative integrated 
framework for pathways design, encouraging cross-stakeholder communication and learning, 
enabling the assessment of compliance with national development and global emissions goals, and 
providing concrete support to policy formation in the context of the PA. This has direct practical 
implications for the revision of all countries’ NDCs in 2020, and the formal stocktake under the 
UNFCCC in 2023.6  
The DDPP pathways design framework provides organizing principles for the definition of the 
national long-term strategies specified in the PA. It is not a methodology to be owned and run by a 
specific institution or government. It is rather an approach to support a shared process for strategy 
and pathway design among diverse groups of stakeholders to inform policy formation, which is 
eventually the responsibility of governments. It provides a structure for national governments to 
conduct stakeholder consultations to educate them, solicit their input, and identify mitigation 
measures and implementation policy packages. It also can help reveal key enabling conditions, such 
as technology development and transfer, finance for investment and adaptation, and institutional 
support, thus enabling more ambitious national NDCs. The framework could also be used by Non-
State Actors such as firms and sectoral associations, regional and city governments, Non-
Governmental Organizations or international bodies to define their contribution to the Paris 
objectives. One important channel where the framework could be mobilized is the 2050 Pathways 
Platform initiative94 which aims to support nations, regions and cities seeking to devise long-term, 
net zero-GHG, climate-resilient and sustainable development pathways.   
At the global level, the DDPP pathways design framework also provides a unifying frame for analysis 
of collective transition effects and implementation challenges from a national perspective. This could 
provide concrete insights into the collective conversation on global-scale cooperation in the 2023 
Global Stocktake introduced in the Paris Agreement. The framework provides also an organizing 
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principle for the emergence of a bottom-up literature on national transitions informing policy 
packages, in the context of global changes and objectives. As such, it could in particular provide a 
foundation for literature feeding into Chapter 4 of the future WG3 AR6 IPCC report, “Mitigation and 
development pathways in the near to mid-term”.  
Future work includes addressing the following priorities. 
First, the DDPP methodology needs to be applied with the “well below 2˚C, towards 1.5˚C” PA 
framing. This means notably adopting more ambitious benchmarks, consistent with global scale 
estimates from the IPCC 1.5°C Special Report.95 These revised benchmarks would help identify the 
additional physical sector changes required beyond those for 2°C, and highlight where domestic 
action and international cooperation should be strengthened. This will involve a more granular 
analysis of challenging sectors such as transport and heavy industry. The latter, for example, requires 
analysis regarding enhancing technology R&D, commercialization support and trade policies where it 
is necessary to protect and encourage first adopters of low, zero or negative emissions 
technologies.83 Non-energy emission sources should also be considered; the DDPP study on 
Indonesia provides a concrete example of how emissions from Agriculture, Forest and Land-Use can 
be treated using the DDPP methodology.96  
Second, more countries, beyond the 16 analyzed explicitly here, must be included to improve 
representation of the global economy, especially developing economies. This will require programs 
to enhance the analytical capacities of developing countries, and a generalization of the DDPP 
framework methodological principles to capture the specifics of development challenges (e.g., access 
to modern energy services). To this effect, a regional DDPP network covering six Latin American 
countries – DDP-LAC – was launched in February 2018 in cooperation between the Inter-American 
Development Bank and IDDRI.  A similar DDPP project in partnership with the German International 
Climate Initiative (IKI) – DDP-BIICS – that focusses on China, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and India 
was launched in December 2018.  
Third, upfront decision maker and stakeholder involvement was in general low in the Phase I 2013-15 
DDPP. The new DDP projects include an explicit engagement dimension with the objective of 
continuous dialogue with domestic decisionmakers to ensure broad ownership of the approach and 
the analysis. Engagement with policymakers is a mandatory component of DDP-LAC, including the 
offering to policymakers of a modelled low emissions development scenario to help inform their 
NDC.  DDP-BIICS will go one step further by involving decisionmakers right from the start in the 
scenario design.   
Fourth, global drivers matter for national based modelling (e.g. cumulative innovation and 
technology learning, projected fossil and renewable fuel prices and supply and demand throughout 
the transition53), and provide a fruitful avenue for cooperation between national and global IAM 
models.  A clear mapping between national and global scales of analysis will be essential for clearly 
articulating enabling conditions for global technology development and transfer, finance for 
investment and adaptation, and institutional support, and will be key to the collective stocktaking 
dialogues.  
Finally, the DDPP pathways design framework could provide a concrete articulation of theoretical 
principles identified by the social sciences transition literature for enabling constructive dialogue 
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amongst stakeholders and decision-makers on system-wide transitions.17,59,97,98 Notably, the 
framework could be used to coordinate techno-economic modelling, socio-technical analysis and 
political analysis. Strategies, modelling, dashboards and pathways could be used for the alignment of 
conceptual languages, bridging of understanding of key ideas, and iteration of alternative visions 
until a working understanding is achieved amongst stakeholders and decision makers.99 Based on 
this, flexible and robust policy packages could be designed to meet national development and global 
emissions goals, taking into account the considerations of equity and poverty reduction referenced in 
Article 4.1. To deepen incorporation of these social science insights, new analytical tools and 
benchmarks are required to allow the translation from the hitherto standard techno-economic point 
of view to a broader perspective on low emissions development for all countries, e.g. based on the 
Sustainable Development Goals.  The 2015 South African68 and Indian DDPP reports70, which used 
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